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In the age-old quest to understand consciousness, scientists put their
most basic assumption on trial
By Samia Bouzid

The Helmholtz Club
The Helmholtz Club was invitation-only.
Don Hoffman, a cognitive neuroscientist fresh out of graduate school at MIT, had just become
an assistant professor at the University of California, Irvine, when an invitation came from the
famed molecular biologist Francis Crick.
Crick, along with his colleague James Watson, had found the answer to the riddle of life in the
twisted strands of a double-helix in 1953. That was it: the code to life was written in a molecule.
Inspired by this simple biological explanation for the abstract mystery of life, Crick began turning
over a new uncracked code by the early 1980s: consciousness.
Ever since humans moved away from mythology and toward reason, the fundamental question
of consciousness has nagged thinkers: Why does existence feel like something? What makes
us more than squishy computers? The question spent centuries bouncing among philosophers
and religious thinkers, but science hadn’t touched it. Now Crick was ready to give it a prod. He
helped form the Helmholtz Club, a secret team of about 20 scientists reaching across disciplines
for clues to the biggest puzzle they’d ever faced.
It was because of Crick that the club, named for the nineteenth-century physicist Hermann von
Helmholtz, remained secret. “He was so famous that if people knew that he was on campus,
they would just mob and ask for his autograph,” Hoffman said. But the Helmholtz Club had no
time for distractions. “If we could just find that ‘double-helix’ of neuroscience, then we could
figure out why and how the brain creates consciousness,” Hoffman said.
The members, handpicked by the founders or other members, came from institutions all over
southern California. Once a month, on a Tuesday, they met for lunch at the UCI University Club,
an elegant clubhouse at the heart of the sprawling campus. Each meeting, they brought in two
speakers, researchers from anywhere in the world whose work might turn over a clue to the
problem of consciousness. While the guests spoke, their audience interrupted them tirelessly
with questions.
“We really just grilled and grilled,” Hoffman said. “What we were trying to do was solve a
problem: how does the brain boot up consciousness?”
The day ended with dinner, wine, and talk of consciousness till the wee hours, often at Pinot
Provence, a southern-France-themed restaurant near the university. For two decades, they

worked and reworked the pieces of the puzzle, until Crick’s death in 2004. Not even the outer
edges of the puzzle were in place.
Still, the Helmholtz Club marked a breakthrough for consciousness studies. At last science had
begun to take a pass at the problem, a challenge that has since become more irresistible than
ever. Neuroscience has tools to scan the brain and map experience to neurons. The baffling
nature of fundamental physics has turned attention on the observer. The prospect of conscious
robots drifts uncertainly on the science fiction-reality spectrum. Today, dozens, perhaps
hundreds, of researchers study consciousness at institutions such as the Mind & Life Institute,
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and New York University.
Still the age-old question remains: Why does processing our world feel like anything at all? Why
does it feel like something — something specific and inescapable — to be you?
Quietly, another old question looms over it: Is this a realistic pursuit for science? Can we, after
all, use our awareness to study the very fact that we are aware?
Minds from Matter
“There is no scientific study more vital to man than the study of his own brain,” Crick wrote in the
conclusion of his 1979 article for Scientific American, a call to action for neuroscientists to take
consciousness seriously. “Our entire view of the universe depends on it.”
Even though the Helmholtz Club did its work in secret in the following decades, to prevent
Crick’s fame from being a distraction, the members published their research widely. Crick wrote
his book “The Astonishing Hypothesis,” which made the case for pursuing consciousness as an
empirical issue. Members planted questions in the minds of their graduate students and
postdocs, who scattered like wind-born dandelion seeds across the country.
By the early 1990s, Hoffman said, the taboo had lifted. In 1994, the puzzle got a name: the
“hard problem,” coined by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers, and scientists thronged
to this newly minted problem.
Most believed, as Crick did, that consciousness arises from the brain — that mind arises from
matter — an approach broadly called materialism. Since then, the brain has been the focus of
most consciousness research, and for good reason. You can lose a finger or even a leg and still
be conscious. But something about the brain clearly has a lock on consciousness.
The study of the brain has revealed a lot about consciousness: The introduction of the fMRI
machine in the 1990s let neuroscientists map people’s thoughts and activities to areas of the
brain. Research on traumatic brain injuries has shown how damage to certain parts of the brain
will render a person unconscious, while damage to other parts may only affect their memory or
behavior. The study of neural networks — computer systems that imitate the human brain —

has even helped us understand, to an extent, how the brain transforms signals from the
environment into our senses.
But nearly four decades since the first days of the Helmholtz Club, despite breakthroughs in
neuroscience, computer science, and fundamental physics, an answer to the root problem —
what is this awareness that sets us apart from computational machines? — continues to elude
capture. Seeing your brain light up while you listen to music or perceive a face does not explain
why you are different from a computer. Knowing where the sense of self sits in the brain does
not explain why it exists in the first place.
Or, as Hoffman put it: “How do sodium and potassium and calcium ions in systems of neurons
going through neural membranes — how does that create in my brain the taste of chocolate?
No one has any clue.”
So, as materialism danced researchers in circles around the same problem, some began to
wonder: Does the brain necessarily give rise to consciousness? What if, for instance, the brain
is like a radio that “tunes in” to consciousness, the way a real radio tunes in to music, without
actually producing it? Some even questioned whether or not humans could ever understand
consciousness — or if it would be like a squirrel trying to learn calculus.
Currently, most bets are still on the brain. One of the leading theories of consciousness, called
integrated information theory, attempts to explain how consciousness could emerge from the
internal connectedness of a brain — or even, hypothetically, a machine.
But others aren’t convinced. Some investigators have begun looking for another explanation.
Among the skeptics is Hoffman, who, from the time he joined the Helmholtz Club in the year
after its inception, had his doubts about materialism. “I wanted to understand the best theories
that there were about how the brain might do this,” he said, “but I was already suspicious of the
whole enterprise.”
He questioned the assumption that underpins materialism: that matter, including the lump of
conveniently organized neurons in the brain, is fundamental. That if you break something into
smaller and smaller pieces, you get matter all the way down.
Hoffman, who by 1986 was working on mathematical models of visual perception, wasn’t ready
to take that for granted.
Questioning Reality
Hoffman was standing in a lab with a few of his collaborators when the way he saw the world
changed forever. The team had developed a mathematical model for visual perception, and out

of it came a clear message: The world we see is probably not a mirror of reality — and probably
not even close.
“It was such a shock that I had to sit down to absorb it,” Hoffman said. It went against every
intuition, but he found no other way to interpret it. “It was the mathematics that forced this
realization on me,” he said.
Hoffman’s skepticism started with the fact that half the brain, billions of neurons, are involved in
vision. This is an outrageous amount of processing power if we assume our brains just describe
the world to us in snapshots, like a friend recounting a vacation. Cameras are much simpler
than computers. “It made me wonder if we are constructing everything that we see instead of
just seeing reality as it is,” Hoffman said, “instead of perception being a mirror of the truth.”
The concept of “constructing” reality was not controversial. But most people took for granted
that evolution would favor the most accurate constructions. Hoffman wasn’t so sure.
He used evolutionary game theory — a well established model for testing which traits will win
out in Darwinian evolution — to put reality to the test. Was a visual system that constructed the
truth the best evolution could do?
It wasn’t. Hoffman found that, overwhelmingly, perception of truth goes extinct.
This happens because truth is expensive. Every shred of information that the brain computes
requires fuel. So the brain skips the scenic route. Over millions of years, it has evolved to take
the electrical information from photons landing on light receptors, shove them through tens of
billions of neurons, and transform those signals into a set of icons that help us navigate the
world without being eaten or falling off cliffs. But those icons, Hoffman cautions, are not the
same thing as reality.
To assume they are would be to make the same mistake as the Australian jewel beetles that
tried to mate with littered beer bottles — because their senses were tuned, in a time before beer
bottles, to find a mate, not to perceive the whole truth.
The jewel beetle did not evolve the ability to distinguish between a beer bottle and a mate. And,
Hoffman considered, humans might not have evolved the ability to discern the origins of
consciousness using the icons of everyday life.
Historically, our accounts of the world have been repeatedly overturned and replaced by newer
accounts, proving earlier versions to be nothing but good approximations. This happened over
and over again, as the ancient Greeks declared our planet round, not flat; as our models of the
Earth put it successively farther from the center of anything. Again this happened when
Newton’s laws, which assume distance and time are absolute, gave way to Einstein’s relativity
and the concept of spacetime, in which distance and time are relative.

Just like old accounts were based on flawed or narrow assumptions, Hoffman thought maybe it
was time for materialism to check what it was standing on.
Uncertainty in Physics
A ping from an RSS feed announced to Chris Fuchs that someone was talking about him.
It was June of 2014, and Fuchs, a quantum information theorist at the University of
Massachusetts, Boston, discovered his name in a new paper by a guy named Donald Hoffman,
titled “Objects of Consciousness.” And with a click, Fuchs, an innocent bystander, was whisked
into the consciousness storm.
Best known for his unorthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fuchs attracts plenty of
offbeat ideas from armchair philosophers and Reddit-educated physics hobbyists. He funnels a
steady trickle of emails into a folder titled “Wackos,” which has 456 emails at the time of writing.
His theory, QBism, not to be confused with his dog by the same name, turns a spotlight on the
unsuspecting “observer,” which, for most of history, has been a physicist trying to spy on reality
from safely outside its confines — to observe a system without being part of it.
Intuitively, there is no problem with this. In everyday life, we can watch a pot boil, a leaf fall, a
balloon rise, and our watching it doesn’t change the fact. But at small scales, this isn’t true. An
electron’s position is described, not by a point, but by a probability function: an equation that
gives the probability that an observer will find an electron in a given location. Until someone
observes it, the location of that electron is smeared across a range of probabilities. Make an
observation, and zing, that blur gives way to a point. That is the essence of quantum
mechanics.
What this means is that at the most fundamental level (that we know of), we have, not matter,
which presumably exists independently of an observer, but a relationship between a subject and
an observer. In most interpretations, the weirdness of quantum mechanics is fully attributable to
the subject — a small thing, like an electron or photon — and the observer is safely outside the
mix.
But with QBism, Fuchs theorizes that the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics reflects the
observer, not the subject. He sees the probability functions as describing something internal to
the observer, something he compares to a “betting attitude.” In which case, the act of making a
measurement doesn’t actually affect the subject; it is only a reflection of what the observer has
measured.
Most physicists are skeptical of Fuchs’ theory, but as of now, there’s no way to prove one
interpretation of quantum mechanics over another. To be clear, neither Fuchs’ theory nor any

leading theories of physics get their legs from consciousness or even imply support for it. “I
don’t know a damn thing about it,” Fuchs stressed. An “observer” refers only to a perspective,
not necessarily to a conscious being.
Yet physics often gets swung around like a weapon in untrained hands, used to slash one idea
or defend another. Quantum mechanics gets it worst of all, since the meaning of its equations is
still up for debate. With the door open to interpretation, in have walked spiritualists, self-helpers,
and other opportunists who have looted it to create pseudoscience like the movie “What the
Bleep Do We Know?” and countless pop psychology books.
The most that can be said is that our current understanding of physics might not clash with
deviations from materialism. Matter might be a useful “icon,” but it might not be a fundamentally
real thing.
Why “Realness” Matters
So what if we don’t see reality, though? Who cares if matter is just one of Hoffman’s “icons” that
our brains construct so they can navigate the world? A brain surgeon never had to pause and
say, “Is this brain fundamentally real?” An astronaut never had to question the realness of the
Earth. Overall, our perceptions are extremely useful for making sense of the world as it relates
to us. Why should consciousness be an exception?
Maybe in the end it won’t be. The fact is nothing is proven yet. But Adam Frank, an
astrophysicist at the University of Rochester who wrote the hotly debated Aeon article
“Materialism Alone Cannot Explain the Riddle of Consciousness,” is doubtful. It’s a mistake, he
says, to think of consciousness as just another physics problem, like a rocket or an apple falling
from a tree. “It's not just another phenomenon,” he said. “Experience” — a term Frank prefers to
“consciousness” — “is the field from which phenomena become possible.”
He thinks that experience tangles up subject and object, observer and observed. In other words,
he believes it represents a combination of our basic awareness and the existence of a world
“out there.” He finds QBism intriguing because it attempts to identify a mechanism for this.
Fuchs’ “betting attitudes” are internal to the observer, but they are informed by, and inseparable
from, the world “out there” (the observed).
The problem is these objections to materialism don’t lead to easy alternatives.
Can Science Explain Consciousness After All?
Faced with the possibility that there may be no “double-helix of neuroscience,” nearly four
decades since Crick initiated the quest, scientists have had to go in radical directions.

“We are flying with our pants off when it comes to this stuff,” Frank said. “All we can do right now
is point in directions we might want to go.” Frank himself doubts we will ever get a true
explanation of consciousness. He doubts that the God’s-eye view invoked by the scientific
method can resolve a problem that can’t extricate itself from the observer.
But others are more hopeful. For now, there is a whole garden of theories and approaches to
consciousness. And there are people watering them all, hoping they will bear fruit.
Hoffman, for example, has a theory that consciousness is more fundamental than matter — that
the universe is made up of fundamental units of consciousness. Instead of starting with the
brain and trying to boot up consciousness, Hoffman is trying to do the opposite. Wild, yes.
Incorrect? Perhaps. But he’s OK with that.
He says that the point is not to get it right immediately. “I want to be so precise that people have
a target to try to prove me wrong. And that's the whole point,” he said. “That's how you then try
to fix things and start a real scientific evolution of ideas.”
Hoffman says that this era is more than a rehashing of the what-ifs from the days when
philosophy had dibs on the study of consciousness. The what-ifs themselves are philosophical
— but many of them now hold the hallmark of science: they are testable.
“What we try to do is take our best theories and push them to their limits and see where they
break,” Hoffman said. Then, he says, comes the exciting part. It takes wrong ideas, Hoffman
says — precise wrong ideas — to make progress.
For sure, many theories of consciousness will either reach dead ends or prove to be misguided.
But for now, little has been ruled out. It’s hard to say exactly who belongs in Fuchs’ folder of
“Wackos.”
To some, this is a useless pursuit. It’s on par with asking the meaning of nothing; it’s like the
head-spinning questions from a child who doesn’t know when to stop asking “why?”
But the problem has always had a sparkle for some people, including Hoffman. “I think the thing
that really got me was the hard problem has been hard for centuries. The best and brightest
minds have been trying to solve this problem, and we haven't got a scientific theory of it,” he
said. “This is the big one.”
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The Construction of Visual Reality (PDF), by Donald Hoffman
History of the Helmholtz Club
1979 issue of Scientific American, contains Crick’s call to action
“I regard consciousness as fundamental, matter is derivative from consciousness. We cannot
get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing,
postulates consciousness.”
- Max Planck

